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Legislative Challenges for the EU after the Treaty of Lisbon
The European Union currently experiences an exceptionally difficult period. 
The outburst of financial crisis in 2007 created unfavourable conditions and new 
challenges with which Member States have struggled by drafting an international 
treaty on fiscal regime. At the same time, it has been the time of implementing and 
testing the provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon of 13 December 2007, which entered 
into force on 1 December 2009. At present, most researchers focus on problems re-
sulting from the crisis and solutions proposed. The objective of this article, however, 
is to analyse legislative issues that are less often discussed. In recent years, some 
negative phenomena connected with the process of establishing EU law became ap-
parent. Should they become regular practices, they might lead to, to quote historical 
institutionalists1, “unintended consequences” in the future.2 Early identification 
of the threats and appropriate remedies is an important task and challenge for the 
entire European Union. Postponing it cannot be justified with the struggle against 
the financial crisis.
In this article, at least six problems of legislative nature that the EU will have 
to solve in the future are identified. In the first part an analysis is offered whose re-
sults demonstrate that the Treaty of Lisbon deepened the legislative exclusion of the 
European Parliament by increasing the number of areas where the EP has no compe-
tences, in terms of both relative and absolute numbers. In the second part the claim 
that the ordinary legislative procedure prevails in the EU is refuted by demonstrating 
that more than half of the treaty basis for enacting legislation includes other proce-
dures. In the third part, negative consequences of trilogues, i.e. informal meetings of 
representatives of the Parliament, Council and Commission in the initial stages of 
the legislative procedure, are discussed. In the fourth part, the issue of the so-called 
early legislative agreements is debated. They result in almost complete disappear-
1 See: C. Hay, D. Wincott, Structure, Agency and Historical Institutionalism, “Political Studies” 
1998, vol. 46, no. 5, pp. 951-957; K. Thelen, Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics, “An-
nual Review of Political Science” 1999, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 369-403.
2 P. Pierson, The Path to European Integration. A Historical Institutionalist Analysis, “Compara-
tive Political Studies” 1996, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 136-139.
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ance of the second and third reading and quicken the decision-making process. The 
fifth part contains an analysis of the effects of the degraded role of the European 
Parliament’s committees in legislative proceedings. In the last part of this paper, the 
phenomenon of “the Council of Ministers without ministers” is characterised, i.e. the 
declining involvement of ministers in the legislative process. 
LEGISLATIVE EXCLUSION Of THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
for many researchers on the European Union, the entering into force of the Trea-
ty of Lisbon (hereinafter also TL) marked a new stage of the functioning of the Euro- 
pean Parliament. Most of them emphasised that the TL strengthened the legislative 
role of that institution by expanding the codecision procedure (the renamed ordinary 
legislative procedure, hereinafter - OLP) to cover farming and fishery, the Common 
Agricultural Policy, transport, structural funds, comitology, intellectual property and 
partly the former third pillar.3 It was also underlined that the TL reformed the assent 
procedure4 in a manner favourable for the Parliament, especially by introducing Arti-
cle 218 to the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union (hereinafter - TfEU), 
under which EU international agreements “concerning the areas subject to the ordi-
nary or special legislative procedure” would require the consent of the Parliament.5 
The power of that provision became apparent in february 2010, when MEPs refused 
to consent to the EU-USA agreement on banking data transfers to the USA via the 
SWIfT network (the so-called “SWIfT agreement”). 6 The TL also eliminated the 
cooperation procedure under which the European Parliament had the weakest posi-
tion, i.e. after consultations.7 In consequence, the European Parliament was to per-
form the most important role in the EU legal system.
3 J.-C. Piris (2010), The Lisbon Treaty: A Legal and Political Analysis, Cambridge, p. 118. 
4 The Treaty of Lisbon replaced the term assent procedure with consent procedure. Though both 
terms refer to the same procedure, the latter is more powerful. The word assent denotes agreement or ac-
quiescence, i.e. relatively feeble approval, while consent designates absolute agreement without which 
no action can be taken. In the Polish versions of the Treaties, this change was not noted.
5 Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the functioning of the 
European Union, “Official Journal of the EU” of 30 March 2010, C 83, p. 145.
6 Legislative resolution of the European Parliament of 11 February 2010 on the proposal for a 
Council decision on the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union and the United States 
of America on the processing and transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the European Union to 
the United States for the purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme (05305/1/2010 REV 
1 – C7-0004/2010 – 2009/0190(NLE)), “Official Journal of the EU” of 16 December 2010, C 341 E, 
p. 100. Later on, after the introduction of some changes, the agreement was approved.
7 Decision Making under Different Institutional Arrangements: Legislation by the European 
Community, “Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics” 1994, vol. 150, no. 4, pp. 642-669; 
C. Crombez, Legislative Procedures in the European Community, “British Journal of Political Science” 
1996, vol. 26, no. 2, pp. 218-220. Other opinions in: G. Garrett, G. Tsebelis, An Institutional Critique of 
Intergovernmentalism, “International Organization”1996, vol. 50, no. 2, p. 290.
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However, if one counted the provisions on the legislative competences of the 
Parliament or their lack, the conclusion can be completely different (Chart 1). Para-
doxically, the Lisbon Treaty did not widen the general legislative competence of the 
Parliament but weakened it! Since the Roman Treaties of 25 March 1957 entered 
into force, the absolute number of primary law provisions that contained any proce-
dure in which the Parliament was involved kept growing and the TL strengthened 
that trend. Since the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) 
and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) an increase in the EP’s 
legislative competences was not accompanied by the introduction of many articles 
excluding its competences but the TL (and the Constitutional Treaty) constituted a 
tipping point: the number of excluding provisions was increased by almost 2/3 (from 
70 articles in the Nice Treaty to 112 articles in the TL). The above observations 
might, however, be distorted as in successive treaties the general number of provi-
sions and EU/EC competence areas rose. That is why the issue should be considered 
in terms of relative numbers. Such an analysis leads to similar conclusions. from the 
entering into force of the Single European Act of 17-28 february 1986, the percent-
age share of primary law articles that did not grant legislative powers to the Euro- 
pean Parliament gradually decreased, only to go up in the TL (from 33.8% in the 
Nice Treaty to 36.8% in the TL). To sum up, though the Lisbon Treaty notably ex-
pands the competences of the EU legislature, it simultaneously excludes the EP from 
some decision-making areas, whereby the latter effect is dominant.
The legislative exclusion of the Parliament means that the EP loses its formal 
impact in many important areas. This refers mainly to the Common Security and 
Defence Policy and partly to the former third pillar8, but also to issues previously 
covered by the EU first pillar policies, e.g. fixing the Common Customs Tariff duties 
(TfEU, Article 31), fixing quantitative limitations of fishing opportunities (TfEU, 
Article 43, Par. 3), establishing other sources of aid than those granted by a Member 
State for entities compatible with the internal market (TfEU, Articles 107 and 108) 
or the application of penal measures if a given Member State incurs excessive deficit 
(TfEU, Article 126). In those areas, the Council holds legislative monopoly. Some 
legislative power is also granted to other EU institutions and bodies (especially the 
European Council and the European Central Bank), while the role of MEPs boils 
down to exerting informal influence. The lack of mention of EP competences in 
112 articles of the currently binding Treaties deepens information deficit in the EU. 
Making the entire documentation public results from the EP’s participation in the 
8 for some researchers this is another argument confirming that the Treaty of Lisbon did not re-
move the pillar structure of the European Union. See: J. Gaspers, The Quest for European Foreign 
Policy Consistency and the Treaty of Lisbon, “Humanitas Journal of European Studies” 2008, vol. 2, no. 
1, p. 35; S. Kurpas, The Treaty of Lisbon – How Much “Constitution” is Left? An Overview of the Main 
Changes, “CEPS Policy Brief” 2007, no. 147, p. 2; P. Kiiver, Lisbon and the Lawyers Reflections on 
What the EU Reform Treaty Means to Jurists, “Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law” 
2007, vol. 14, no. 4, p. 338.
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legislative process. Since other institutions are not obliged to publish all their docu-
ments, excluding the EU legislature is therefore tantamount to losing access to infor-
mation on positions held by decision-makers, debates, the preparatory process and 
proceedings.9 Marginalisation of the Parliament also means that legislative debates 
and public opinion control of the legislation have been brought to a halt. The above 
increases the distance between the European Union and its citizens and poses the risk 
of flawed legislation that is not suited to citizens’ needs. finally, it leads to excluding 
national parliaments, as – in compliance with the Treaties – they obtain information 
9 The Treaties only mention that all Member States shall engage in sincere cooperation (TEU, Ar-
ticle 4, judgement of the European Court in Case 204/86 Hellenic Republic v Council and judgement of 
the Court in Case 70/88 Chernobyl), as well as mutual consultations (TfEU, Article 295) between insti-
tutions, however, this is not tantamount to the automatic obligation to share information. History shows 
that the latter issue was the subject of informal agreements. See: R. Corbett, f. Jacobs, M. Shackleton 
(2000), The European Parliament, London, p. 176 ff. In the EU, the regulation on access to documents 
is still valid, but it is restrictive on public access to political documents drafted by the Council or other 
institutions. See: Regulation (EC) no. 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 
May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents “Offi-
cial Journal of the EC” of 31 May 2011, L 145, pp. 43-48.
Number of treaty provisions not foreseeing any legislative power of the EP
Number of treaty provisions foreseeing legislative power of the EP
Share of treaty provision not foreseeing any legislative power of the EP (%)
Chart 1
Absolute and relative numbers of treaty provisions granting and not granting legislative powers  
to the European Parliament
Explanations: Left Y axis – absolute number of provisions, right Y axis – relative number (percentage).
Source: Author’s own calculations based on EU Treaties. The years refer to the dates on which the Treaties were 
signed: 1957 – Roman Treaties, 1986 – Single European Act, 1992 – Maastricht Treaty, 1997 – Amsterdam Treaty, 
2001 – Nice Treaty, 2004 – the Constitutional Treaty, 2007 – Lisbon Treaty.
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only about legislative acts10, i.e. regulations, directives and decisions adopted “joint-
ly by the Parliament and the Council, by the Parliament with the participation of the 
Council or by the Council with the participation of the Parliament”.11
THE ILLUSION Of THE ORDINARY LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE
A wide extension of the codecision procedure (as the OLP) with 44 new instances 
(30 articles where codeciding replaced other procedures, and 14 new articles) was 
positively evaluated by EU researchers. It was expected that as a result of the reform, 
approximately 95% of all EU secondary law would be adopted in accordance with 
the OLP.12 Looking at the number of legislative proposals and acts adopted in the Euro- 
pean Union in the years 1993-2011, one might consider the above prognosis to be 
accurate (Charts 2 and 3). Practically from the entering into force of the Maastricht 
Treaty (1 November 1993) to 2009, consultations were the prevailing legislative 
procedure. Initially, codecision was the procedure selected for the adoption of a few 
regulations, but after the Amsterdam Treaty entered into force (on 1 May 1999), 
it started to resemble consultations. This happened because the codecision process 
was extended from fifteen to thirty articles by that Treaty.13 The adoption of the Nice 
Treaty (1 february 2003) did not lead to the strengthening of this procedure. In a 
way, it set the kinds of regulations adopted under this procedure. The above confirms 
critical opinions on the provisions of this Treaty (and references to the Treaty not 
being so nice).14 The breakthrough did not come about until the Treaty of Lisbon. 
Although in the first years of applying its provisions, the number of legislative acts 
passed under the OLP was close to the prognosis, the number of the Commission’s 
proposals presented in 2011 that will be examined at the end of the seventh term 
of the Parliament (2009-2014) shows that codecision clearly prevails over consulta-
tions (in 2011, 88.8% of legislative proposals were adopted under the OLP).
10 See: TEU, Article 12(a) and the Protocol on the Role of National Parliaments in the European 
Union, in: Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the Euro- 
pean Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007, “Official Journal of the EU” of 17 December 
2009, C 306, p. 148, Article 2.
11 TfEU, Article 289. See: Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union..., p. 172.
12 J. J. Węc, Reforma systemu instytucjonalnego Unii Europejskiej przewidywana w Traktacie liz-
bońskim, “Rocznik Integracji Europejskiej” 2009, no. 3, p. 59.
13 R. Corbett, f. Jacobs, M. Shackleton, op. cit., p. 191.
14 C. Neuhold, The European Parliament and the European Commission: ‘You Can’t Always Get 
What You Want’, in: f. Laursen (ed.) (2006), The Treaty of Nice: Actor Preferences, Bargaining and In-
stitutional Choice, Leiden, pp. 351-367; M. Gray, A. Stubb, The Treaty of Nice – Negotiating a Poisoned 
Chalice, “Journal of Common Market Studies” 2001, vol. 39, no. 2, pp. 5-23; M. Hosli, M. Machover, 
The Nice Treaty and Voting Rules in the Council: A Reply to Moberg (2002), “Journal of Common Mar-
ket Studies” 2004, vol. 42, no. 3, pp. 497-521.
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Chart 2
Number of legislative proposals put forward by the Commission in 1993-2011  
and procedures applicable 
Source: PreLex, the Commission’s database on interinstitutional procedures in the European Union, http://ec. 
europa.eu/prelex/apcnet.cfm?CL=en.
Chart 3
Number of legislative proposals adopted under particular procedures in 1993-2011
Source: The Legislative Observatory of the European Parliament, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/index.
jsp, own calculations. 
Consultation Cooperation Codecision Consent
Consultation CooperationConsentCodecision
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The preponderance of the OLP, however, turns out to be an illusion if one looks 
at the number of treaty provisions that foresee this procedure (Chart 4). Although in 
the TL, for the first time in the history of the European Union, the OLP is mentioned 
in more provisions than consultation, the percentage share of the former procedure 
accounts for about 46% of legislative acts, which means that more than a half of pri-
mary law provisions require a different procedure of adoption. Both information and 
consultation, where the Parliament has a very weak position15, are referred to in as 
much as 40.6% of all articles, which reveals that the OLP prevalence is an illusion. 
Of course, that becomes blurred in the every-day functioning of the EU as the pro-
visions that foresee the OLP generate a very high number of legislative proposals. 
However, issues consulted and announced frequently refer to seldom regulated key 
areas such as the implementation of collective agreements at the European level 
(TfEU, Article 155, Par. 2), suspension of an international agreement (TfEU, Ar-
ticle 218, Par. 9-10), social security and social protection (TfEU, Article 21, Par. 
3), provisions on passports, identity cards and residence permits (TfEU, Article 77, 
Par. 3), cross-border cooperation between judicial and police authorities (TfEU, Ar-
ticle 89), discrimination against carriers (TfEU, Article 95, Par. 3), prohibition of 
abusing the dominant position or agreements between enterprises that disrupt the 
internal market (TfEU, Article 103. Par. 1), harmonisation of indirect taxes (Article 
113 of the TfEU), approximation of laws on internal markets (TfEU, Article 115), 
supervision of financial institutions (TfEU, Article 127, Par. 6), employment poli-
cy (TfEU, Article 148, Par. 2), decision on whether a Member State applying for 
accession to the Eurozone fulfils the necessary convergence criteria (TfEU, Article 
140, Par. 2), special R&D programmes (TfEU, Article 182, Par. 4), measures signif-
icantly affecting a Member State’s choice between different energy sources and the 
general structure of its energy supply (TfEU, Article 192, Par. 2c), and decisions on 
the EU system of own resources (TfEU, Article 311). In those areas the position of 
the European Parliament is weak because formally they are regulated by Member 
States individually.
15 See: C. Crombez, Legislative Procedures..., p. 205; S. Napel, M. Widgrén, Strategic versus 
Non-strategic Voting Power in the EU Council of Ministers: The Consultation Procedure, “Social Choice 
and Welfare” 2011, vol. 37, no. 3, p. 515; R. Scully, The European Parliament and the Codecision Pro-
cedure: A Reassessment, “Journal of Legislative Studies” 1997, vol. 3, no. 3, p. 60; B. Steunenberg, 
op. cit., p. 651; G. Garrett, From the Luxembourg Compromise to Codecision: Decision-Making in the Euro- 
pean Union, “Electoral Studies” 1995, vol. 14, no. 3, p. 294. In some situations, and when employing 
informal mechanisms, the Parliament is capable of attaining a strong position in consultations. See: 
R. Kardasheva, The Power to Delay: The European Parliament’s Influence in the Consultation Proce-
dure, “Journal of Common Market Studies” 2009, vol. 47, no. 2, pp. 385-409; A. Kirpsza, Formalnie 
słaby, nieformalnie silny. Pozycja Parlamentu Europejskiego w procedurze konsultacji na przykładzie 
procesu uchwalania rozporządzenia ustanawiającego zasady dobrowolnej modulacji płatności bez-
pośrednich, “Rocznik Integracji Europejskiej” 2011, no. 5.
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Chart 4
Number of treaty articles that foresee application of specific legislative procedures
Explanations: Left Y axis – absolute number of provisions, right Y axis – relative number of provisions (percentage).
Source: Author’s own calculations based on EU Treaties. The years refer to the dates on which the Treaties 
were signed, see: Chart 1. 
THE TRILOGUE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
The Maastricht Treaty introduced the codecision procedure, which created in-
terdependencies between the Council and the Parliament.16 The first symptom 
of this change was the application of the ONP to Voice Telephony Directive.17 After 
unsuccessful negotiations in the Conciliation Committee, the Council decided to 
propose its own common position as the final version of the regulation. It believed 
that the Parliament would not be capable of obtaining the absolute majority of votes 
required to veto the regulation (the so-called third reading). However, the Council 
underestimated the Parliament, as 379 MEPs voted against the legislative propo-
sal. That number of votes sufficed to reject the draft directive and demonstrated 
the strong position of the Parliament in the codecision procedure.18 That was the 
16 M. Shackleton, The Interinstitutional Balance in the EU: What Has Happened Since 1999?, 
“EUSA Review” 2004, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 2-3; M. Shackleton, T. Raunio, Codecision since Amster-
dam: A Laboratory for Institutional Innovation and Change, “Journal of European Public Policy” 2003, 
vol. 10, no. 2, p. 173.
17 Proposal for a Council Directive on the application of open network provision (ONP) to voice 
telephony, “Official Journal of the European Communities” of 12 October 1992, C 263, pp. 20-36, later 
amended.
18 M. Shackleton, The Politics of Codecision, “Journal of Common Market Studies” 2000, vol. 38, 
no. 2, p. 327. The draft directive was presented by the Commission in 1992 while the common position 
of the Council was rejected by the Parliament in July 1994.
Cooperation
Codecision/OLP
Consent
Information
Consultation
Codecision/OLP share
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moment when both institutions understood that without direct and deep cooperation 
they would not achieve satisfactory, effective and quick agreements. That is why 
already in 1995, they established informal meetings of their representatives – the so-
called trilogues. Trilogues are held before meetings of the Conciliation Committee 
and their objective is to get an agreement on amendments that would later be en-
dorsed by the said Committee and involved institutions.19 The interdependencies be-
tween the Parliament and the Council were tightened after the entering into force of 
the Amsterdam Treaty that introduced the possibility of ending the codecision proce-
dure already at the first reading (the so-called fast track legislation) and cancelled the 
so-called special third reading. As a result, the Council could not impose its position 
on the Parliament after conciliation failure.20 Consequently, in 1999 the Council, 
the Parliament and the Commission entered into an interinstitutional agreement in 
which they stated that pre-conciliation trilogues proved to be a success and therefore 
“this practice, which has developed at all stages of the codecision procedure, must 
continue to be encouraged”.21 In result, the trilateral meetings have become common 
practice also before the first and second readings.
Nowadays, the trilogues (also referred to as “trialogues”)22 are informal meet-
ings of representatives of the Commission (heads of relevant Directorates-Gener-
al, sometimes Commissioners), the Council (delegates of the Presidency, the head 
of COREPER, heads of working groups, sometimes Ministers), and the Parliament 
(heads of committees, rapporteurs, shadow rapporteurs, coordinators of political par-
liamentary groups and deputy presidents).23
Trilogues are held at the early stages of the legislative procedure and they are 
aimed at drafting the initial legislative agreement that will be adopted by the Council 
19 Ibid., p. 334.
20 A. Maurer, The Legislative Powers and Impact of the European Parliament, “Journal of Com-
mon Market Studies” 2003, vol. 41, no. 2, pp. 228-230; H. farrell, A. Héritier, Formal and Informal 
Institutions Under Codecision: Continuous Constitution-Building in Europe, “Governance” 2003, vol. 
16, no. 4, pp. 589-590; C. Reh, A. Héritier, E. Bressanelli, C. Koop, The Informal Politics of Legislation: 
Explaining Secluded Decision-making in the European Union, paper prepared for the APSA Annual 
Convention, Washington, 2-5 September 2010, p. 8.
21 Joint Declaration on Practical Arrangements for the New Codecision Procedure (Article 251 of 
the Treaty establishing the European Community), “Official Journal of the European Communities” of 
28 May 1999, C 148, p. 1.
22 Both terms are used in EU documentation. In this article, I will use the term “trilogue”.
23 H. farrell, A. Héritier, Interorganizational Negotiation and Intraorganizational Power in Shared 
Decision-Making: Early Agreements under Codecision and Their Impact on the European Parliament 
and the Council of Ministers, “Reihe Politikwissenschaft/Political Science Series” no. 95, March 2004, 
p. 12; P. Settembri, C. Neuhold, Achieving Consensus Through Committees: Does the European Parlia-
ment Manage?, “Journal of Common Market Studies” 2009, vol. 47, no. 1, p. 144; A. Héritier, C. Reh, 
Codecision and Its Discontents: Intra-organisational Politics and Institutional Reform in the European 
Parliament, paper prepared for the EUSA Biannual Meeting, Boston, 3-5 March 2011, p. 7. Trilogues 
are attended by up to 40 persons. See: Codecision and National Parliamentary Scrutiny: Report with 
Evidence, House of Lords: European Union Committee, 17th Report of Session, London 2009, p. 13.
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and the Parliament in good faith and without significant amendments. Application 
of this mechanism is very widespread, which is reflected by the fact that already in 
the years 1999-2000, trilogues were held to discuss 41% of modified legislative acts 
adopted under the codecision procedure and this share grew every year (Table 1). 
The year 2007 turned out to be the culminating point of this trend. Under the new in-
terinstitutional agreement24, trilogues were institutionalised and since 2007 they are 
part of processing all legislative proposals adopted under codecision. They have also 
been used in consultations and the budget procedure, where they are traditionally 
referred to as “concertation”.25
The impact of trilogues on the legislative procedure is ambivalent. Some re-
searchers underline that trilogues have contributed to the creation of a culture of trust 
and cooperation between representatives of the three institutions, thanks to which the 
decision-making process is cooperative and based on mutual trust.26 Other positive 
aspects attributed to trilogies include the strengthening of the legislative position of 
the Parliament. In trilogues, the Parliament has greater opportunities of effectively 
promoting its amendments than in isolation. In trilogues, the EP can put its strategic, 
negotiating and networking capacities to better use.27 from the perspective of social 
constructionism, trilogues also strengthen the normative co-dependency which con-
sists in the reduction of formal differences between legislative procedures.28 Finally, 
trilogues facilitate interinstitutional negotiations and allow for reaching an agree-
ment already at first reading.29
However, trilogues also generate many negative effects. first and foremost, they 
only allow selected entities to access the legislative process. Only a small group of 
representatives of the three institutions participate in the trilogues (in literature of 
the field, this group is referred to as “relais actors”30) and they control the course and 
results of the legislative procedure. This has three important consequences.
24 Joint declaration on practical arrangements for the codecision procedure (Article 251 of the EC 
Treaty), “Official Journal of the European Union” of 30 June 2007, C 145, pp. 5-9.
25 R. Corbett, f. Jacobs, M. Shackleton, op. cit., p. 183.
26 M. Shackleton, The Politics of..., pp. 333, 335-336; H. farrell, A. Héritier, Interorganizational 
Negotiation..., pp. 13-14.
27 B. Steunenberg, T. Selck, Testing Procedural Models of EU Legislative Decision-Making, in: 
R. Thomson, f. Stokman, T. König, C. Achen (ed.) (2006), The European Union Decides: Testing Theo-
ries of European Decision Making, Cambridge, p. 81; f. Häge, M. Kaeding, Reconsidering the Europe-
an Parliament’s Legislative Influence: Formal vs. Informal Procedures, “Journal of European Integra-
tion” 2007, vol. 29, no. 3, p. 357; H. farrel l, A. Héritier, Formal and Informal..., p. 594.
28 See: A. Kirpsza, Formalnie słaby, nieformalnie silny...
29 R. Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou, A. Vidal-Quadras, M. Rothe, Activity Report of the delegations to 
the Conciliation Committee, 1 May 2004-13 July 2009 (sixth parliamentary term), PE427.162v01-00, 
p. 12.
30 H. farrell, A. Héritier, Interorganizational Negotiation..., p. 14.
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Table 1
Trilogues under codecision and consultation in the years 1999-2007
Codecision Consultation
Trilogues Absence of 
trilogues
Share of tri-
logues (%)
Trilogues Absence of 
trilogues
Share of tri-
logues (%)
1999/2000 18 26 41%  0 53 0%
2000/2001 48 28 63%  3 76 4%
2001/2002 44 26 63%  0 75 0%
2002/2003 48 13 79%  1 73 1%
2003/2004 69 15 82%  1 77 1%
2004/2005 54  3 96%  5 43 10%
2005/2006 50  0 100% 12 51 19%
2006/2007 28  0 100%  4 29 12%
total 359 111 76% 26 477 5%
Explanations: from 1 May of the given year to 30 April of the following year.
Source: R. Kardasheva, Legislative Package Deals in EU Decision-Making: 1999-2007, thesis submitted to the 
European Institute of the London School of Economics, April 2009, p. 26.
firstly, an asymmetry between different members of the Council and the Parlia-
ment is apparent as those who do not participate in a trilogue cannot exert similar 
influence on the legislative procedure. Thus trilogues disturb the strongly enrooted 
norm of proportional participation in the decision-making process and have intro-
duced a division into the weak and the powerful. In the case of the Council, informal 
negotiations strengthen the Presidency, and especially the chair of COREPER I who 
can adjust the given legislative proposal at will at the trilateral meetings while other 
ministers have no possibility to learn about the course of events.31 In the Parliament, 
the winners are committee chairpersons, rapporteurs, coordinators and MEPs repre-
senting large groups as they participate in trilogues and decide who should join the 
trilateral meetings. The President and Vice President of the European Parliament, 
the MEPs who belong to small groups and the committees lose as their access to 
trilateral meetings is limited.32
Secondly, the dominant and elitist position of the relais actors enables them to 
escape the watchful eye of their mandators. Examples of such situations are, inter 
alia, as follows: transgressing the negotiation mandate, promoting solutions com-
pliant with one’s own preferences and employing the fait accompli tactics, i.e. pre-
senting institutions with legislative proposals containing a note that this is the only 
31 Ibid., p. 17.
32 Ibid., pp. 14-16; A. Héritier, C. Reh, Codecision and Its Discontents..., pp. 11-15.
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acceptable solution.33 In result, the Council and the Parliament cannot control and 
monitor the activity of its agents, but for the good of effective legislative processes 
they have to make do with their “legislative intermediaries”.
Thirdly, the elitism of the legislative procedure might deform the culture of con-
sensus so deeply embedded in the Council. The culture of consensus consists in 
reaching legislative compromises accepted by all Council members.34 The represent-
ative of the Presidency that participates in trilogues is isolated from the institutional 
environment of the Council, and therefore might, in cooperation with MEPs, seek 
solutions that are especially beneficial for his/her Member State excluding prefer-
ences of other EU Member States. Already at the stage of trilateral meetings, the 
Presidency representative might build a coalition with Council members and secure 
the required number of votes and might later use this majority at the adoption stage. 
Such a strategy would be particularly feasible in the case of large and highly popu-
lated Member States that have large voting weights.35
Trilogues also generate coordination difficulties, in particular rivalry between 
negotiators representing the same institution.36 This results mainly from point 8 of 
the interinstitutional agreement of 2007 which stipulates that trilogues “may be held 
at all stages of the procedure and at different levels of representation, depending 
on the nature of the expected discussion”.37 Those levels are decided upon main-
ly by group coordinators at their informal meetings. The issue of rivalry applies 
particularly the Parliament, which – in the course of procedures – is represented 
by many highly authorised entities that stem from various, sometimes opposing, 
political backgrounds.38 The complex relations between those functions might affect 
the legislative process. This happened during the negotiations on the regulation on 
33 N. Yordanova, Plenary ‘Amendments’ to Committee Reports: Legislative Powers of the European 
Parliament Committees, paper presented at the APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting and the EUSA 2009 Los 
Angeles Meeting, version: August 2010, p. 6.
34 D. Heisenberg, The Institution of “Consensus” in the European Union: Formal versus Informal 
Decision-Making in the Council, “European Journal of Political Research” 2005, vol. 44, no. 1, pp. 65- 
-90; J. Lewis, Is the “Hard Bargaining” Image of the Council Misleading? The Committee of Perma-
nent Representatives and the Local Elections Directive, “Journal of Common Market Studies” 1998, 
vol. 36, no. 4, pp. 479-504; f. Hayes-Renshaw, W. van Aken, H. Wallace, When and Why the EU Coun-
cil of Ministers Votes Explicitly, “Journal of Common Market Studies” 2006, vol. 44, no. 1, p. 163; 
A. Kirpsza, Wpływ kryzysu finansowego na proces podejmowania decyzji w Unii Europejskiej, “Studia 
Polityczne” 2012, no. 28, pp. 321-322.
35 H. farrell, A. Héritier, The Invisible Transformation of Codecision: Problems of Democratic 
Legitimacy, “SIEPS Report” 2003, no. 7, p. 31.
36 Ibid., p. 11; H. farrell, A. Héritier, Interorganizational negotiation..., p. 19; P. Hausemer, Partici- 
pation and Political Competition in Committee Report Allocation: Under What Conditions Do MEPs 
Represent Their Constituents?, “European Union Politics” 2006, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 505-530; N. Yordano-
va, The Effect of Inter-institutional Rules on the Division of Power in the European Parliament: Alloca-
tion of Consultation versus Codecision Reports, Paper prepared for the 11th Biannual Conference of the 
European Union Studies Association Los Angeles, California, 23-25 April 2009.
37 Joint declaration on practical arrangements for..., p. 6.
38 P. Settembri, C. Neuhold, op. cit., pp. 141-143.
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advanced therapy medicinal products.39 During its adoption, the main rapporteur, 
Miroslav Mikolášik, representing the European People’s Party – European Demo-
crats (EPP-ED, currently EPP), clashed with the shadow rapporteurs of the Party of 
European Socialists (PES, currently S&D), the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats 
for Europe (ALDE) and European United Left /Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) on 
the issue of “ethical” amendments to the legislative proposal. failing to win the 
support of the Council and the Commission, he decided to break off the negotia-
tions, threatening that the legislative procedure would be extended and the second 
reading would be held. However, the shadow rapporteurs decided to continue the 
trilogue without Mikolášik. They drafted a new legislative agreement that did not 
foresee “ethical” amendments. Next, they presented the agreement, in the form of a 
report, to a plenary of the Parliament, and – although it contained modifications that 
had not been consulted with the Commission and the main rapporteur, it won the 
support of MEPs and entered into force as an act of law.40 Opposite situations also 
took place. Negotiations on access to EU institutions’ documentation41 reached a 
standstill caused by objections of the shadow rapporteurs. It was decided to exclude 
the shadow rapporteurs from the trilogue and the agreement was reached.42 Conflicts 
between negotiators hamper coordination of the Parliament’s position, which gives 
more leverage to the Council represented by one leader – the deputy ambassador of 
the Member State holding the Presidency (head of COREPER I).43
Trilogues are also a threat to transparency, proportional representation and de-
mocracy.44 They are closed-door meetings and thus their course remains unknown 
to the public, the media, national parliaments and non-governmental organisations. 
Consequently, no entity is capable of controlling the legislative process.45 Moreover, 
trilogues impair the influence of the weakest parliamentary groups on the legisla-
tive procedure. Their MEPs rarely participate in trilateral meetings and seldom have 
39 Regulation (EC) No 1394/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 
2007 on advanced therapy medicinal products and amending Directive 2001/83/EC and Regulation 
(EC) No. 726/2004, “Official Journal of the European Union” of 10 December 2007, L 324, pp. 121-137.
40 D. Judge, D. Earnshaw, ‘Relais Actors’ and Codecision First Reading Agreements in the Euro-
pean Parliament: The Case of the Advanced Therapies Regulation, “Journal of European Public Policy” 
2011, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 59-66.
41 Regulation (EC) no. 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 
regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents “Official Journal 
of the European Union” of 31 May 2001, L 145, pp. 43-48.
42 T. Bunyan, Secret Trilogues and the Democratic Deficit, Statewatch Viewpoint, September 
2007, p. 9.
43 M. Shackleton, T. Raunio, op. cit., pp. 174-176.
44 T. Bunyan, op. cit., p. 9; B. Petkova, T. Dumbrovsk, Conciliation in the Sixth European Par-
liament: Formal Transparency vs. Shadowy Legislating, paper presented at UACES Exchanging Ideas 
on Europe: Europe at a Crossroads, Bruges, 6-8 September 2010, p. 3 and next. Contrary view in: 
A. Rasmussen, Early Conclusion in Bicameral Bargaining: Evidence from the Codecision Legislative 
Procedure of the European Union, “European Union Politics” 2011, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 61-62.
45 H. farrell, A. Héritier, The Invisible Transformation..., p. 8.
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the opportunity to play a major role in negotiations. They are overlooked by the 
Council’s negotiators who prefer to contact representatives of large political groups 
as they guarantee the required support in the Parliament.46 The trilogues also ex-
clude MEPs representing Member States that joined the European Union in 2004 and 
2007. In 2006 and 2007, around 6% of MEPs representing new EU Member States 
participated in trilateral meetings, but from 2008 to 2010 not a single one attended 
a trilogue.47 This is mainly due to discriminating new MEPs in the process of ap-
pointing rapporteurs. In the sixth term of the European Parliament (2004-2009), they 
performed this function only in 9% of all codecisions, although new MEPs account 
for 22% of all Members of the European Parliament.48
The trilogues also pose the risk of establishing relations between governments of 
a Member State and its MEPs, which might influence the outcome of the legislative 
process. To provide an example: Germany has the largest national delegation to the 
Parliament, and its MEPs hold key positions in this institution.49 The German gov-
ernment can count on their vast support in the European legislature and can make 
use of it while pressing for regulations it prefers in the course of interinstitutional 
negotiations.50 The case of the Takeovers Directive speaks volumes here.51 Germany 
opposed the proposal but did not manage to win enough votes to block it at the Coun-
cil. Eventually, the Council adopted the agreement drafted by the Conciliation Com-
mittee. However, the regulation was rejected by the Parliament where rapporteur 
Klaus-Heiner Lehne, a German, effectively sought the support of MEPs.52 Such na-
tional cooperation is possible, as trilogue participants include representatives of the 
Presidency and rapporteurs representing the same Member State or political party. 
Research shows that if the interests of the rapporteur participating in the trilogue and 
the preferences of the Minister representing the Presidency are convergent, which 
happens quite often if the two share common political or national identity, the likeli-
hood of finalising the legislative agreement increases markedly.53
46 Ibid., p. 25; M. Shackleton, T. Raunio, op. cit., pp. 177-178; H. farrell, A. Héritier, Formal and 
Informal..., p. 592.
47 B. Petkova, T. Dumbrovsk, op. cit., p. 12.
48 M. Kaeding, S. Hurka, Where are the MEPs from the accession countries? Rapporteurship as-
signments in the European Parliament after Enlargement, “EIPASCOPE” 2010, no. 2, p. 23.
49 Currently, German MEPs head three of the seven parliamentary groups: S&D (Martin Schulz), 
the Greens (Rebecca Harms) and GUE/NGL (Lothar Bisky). They also hold unduly numerous key po-
sitions such as heads of commissions and coordinators of political groups. See: ibid., p. 23; A. Kirpsza, 
Duch d’Hondta w Strasburgu. Zasada proporcjonalnej dystrybucji stanowisk w Parlamencie Europej-
skim, “Przegląd Politologiczny” 2012, vol. 16, no. 4.
50 H. farrell, A. Héritier, The Invisible Transformation..., p. 9; A. Rasmussen, op. cit., p. 13.
51 Proposal for a 13th European Parliament and Council Directive on company law concerning 
takeover bids, COM/95/0655 final, “Official Journal of the European Communities” of 6 June 1996, 
C 162, pp. 5-8, later amended.
52 H. farrell, A. Héritier, The Invisible Transformation..., p. 28.
53 C. Reh, A. Héritier, E. Bressanelli, C. Koop, op. cit., p. 34; A. Rasmussen, op. cit., p. 55.
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THE “DEATH” Of THE SECOND AND THIRD READINGS
The trilogues produce legislative agreements that are adopted in the initial phases 
of legislative procedures. In the literature of the field, they are referred to as “ear-
ly agreements” because they are reached before the Parliament adopts a legislative 
resolution and before the Council adopts its common position (first-reading early 
agreements) or between the adoption of the resolution by the MEPs and the adop-
tion of a common position by the Council (second-reading early agreements).54 Of 
course, not every trilogue ends with an early agreement. However, quantitative analy- 
ses demonstrate that in recent years they often have. In the fifth term of the European 
Parliament (1999-2004), the adoption of 20% of legal acts at first reading and 6% 
at second reading was the outcome of early agreements. In the sixth term of the EP, 
those values amounted to 72% and 18% respectively.55 This proves that the trilogues 
are exceptionally effective in securing legislative compromises.
Early agreements have led to a remodelling of the legislative process which is 
reflected by the complete breakdown of the OLP system of three readings specified 
in the Treaties.56 This is not accidental as, under the 1999 interinstitutional agree-
ment, the Council and the Parliament undertook to cooperate with each other “in 
good faith throughout the procedure with a view to reconciling their positions as far 
as possible and thereby clearing the way, where appropriate, for the adoption of the 
act concerned at an early stage of the procedure”.57 In result, the number of legal acts 
adopted at the second and third readings dropped notably. The last year of the sixth 
term of the EP (2008-2009) was the turning point. The number of regulations adopt-
ed under codecision reached its all-time high (177 legal acts)58. Legal acts adopted at 
first reading accounted for 80% of all legislative acts (16% at second reading, 4% at 
third reading).59 This trend continues also after the Lisbon Treaty, which means that 
the EU has witnessed the informal “death” of the second and third readings.
The diktat of the first reading means that legislative proposals presented to the in-
stitutions can hardly be modified. The compromise reached by the trilogue is forward-
ed, in the form of a letter with amendments to the proposal, by the chair of COREP-
ER I to the chair of the relevant parliamentary committee. The letter reads that the 
Council “is willing to accept that outcome, subject to legal-linguistic verification, 
should it be confirmed by the vote in plenary”.60 This means that the Parliament has 
54 Codecision and National Parliamentary Scrutiny..., p. 12.
55 C. Reh, A. Héritier, E. Bressanelli, C. Koop, op. cit., p. 9.
56 See: Article 294 of the TfEU.
57 Joint Declaration on Practical Arrangements..., p. 1, point I.1; Joint Declaration on Practical 
Arrangements..., p. 6, point 11.
58 R. Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou, A. Vidal-Quadras, M. Rothe, op. cit., p. 10.
59 In the years 2009-2010, the share of legal acts adopted at first reading amounted to as much as 
97%, but it ought to be noted that in this period a low number of legal acts was adopted. This has been 
shown in Chart 3.
60 Joint declaration on practical arrangements for..., p. 6.
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little room for manoeuvre. Its modifying proposals might ruin the compromise and 
lead to the launch of a long procedure that distorts the essence of interinstitutional 
agreements and would violate mutual trust. Moreover, the agreements reached by 
the elitist representatives put the ministers and MEPs in a difficult situation: either 
they accept the trilogue arrangements, or they modify them, i.e. reject them and risk 
the lack of any legislation (take it or leave it). In such circumstances, the ministers 
and MEPs are pressed to approve of the outcomes of trilateral negotiations, even 
if they do not correspond to the position of the institution. Still, adopting the early 
agreement is a better option than unleashing criticism of failed negotiations and the 
consequences of the legal loophole.61
The reaching of early agreements before the Council and the Parliament adopt 
common positions together with the agreements’ rigidity lead to a situation where 
there is no point of reference for negotiations.62 The mandate of the Presidency is not 
based on the formal decision of the Council63 while the MEPs do not have to follow 
the mandate of the Committee and thus representatives of both institutions have vast 
liberty in reaching legislative compromises. In consequence, not only trilogues but 
also trilateral arrangements are beyond public control. They are part of the legisla-
tive process but at closed institutional forums. Heated disputes and social consul-
tations held at the time are mere window dressing as everything has been decided 
beforehand. Votes are nothing more than a ceremonious approval of the agreements 
reached covertly and informally.
The finalisation of legislative procedures at first reading also speeded the OLP. 
In 1999-2000, it took 729 days on average to adopt one legal act. In 2006-2007, only 
310 days were needed.64 This change means that there is less time for deliberation, 
debates with social partners and political bargaining on the final wording of the leg-
islative proposal.65 Some scholars note that trilogues take long time if proposals are 
61 C. Reh, The Informal Politics of Codecision: Towards a Normative Assessment, paper prepared 
for the UACES Conference on Exchanging Ideas on Europe, University of Edinburgh, 1-3 September 
2008, p. 26; A. Rasmussen, M. Shackleton, The Scope for Action of European Parliament Negotiators 
in the Legislative Process: Lessons of the Past and for the Future, paper prepared for the Ninth Biennial 
International Conference of the European Union Studies Association, Austin, Texas, March 31-April 2, 
2005, p. 17.
62 M. Shackleton, T. Raunio, op. cit., p. 178.
63 H. farrell, A. Héritier, Interorganizational negotiation..., p. 13. Sometimes the voting is based 
on the informal political agreement reached by ministers.
64 R. Kardasheva, Legislative Package Deals in EU Decision-Making: 1999-2007, thesis submitted 
to the European Institute of the London School of Economics, April 2009, p. 27; S. Hix, Memorandum, 
in: Codecision and National Parliamentary Scrutiny..., p. 92. In comparison to the fifth term (1999-
-2004), in the EP’s sixth term the average time of adopting a legal act in codecision was 1.3 month 
shorter. See: R. Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou, A. Vidal-Quadras, M. Rothe, op. cit., p. 14.
65 J. De Clerck-Sachsse, P. Kaczynski, The European Parliament – More Powerful, Less Legiti-
mate?, “CEPS Working Document” 2009, no. 314, p. 11; C. Reh, op. cit., p. 14.
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crucial and then there is time for discussion66. They, however, seem to overlook the 
fact that these negotiations are held in camera and shy away from public communi-
cation platforms and institutions.
Early agreements also entail negative consequences for democracy at the nation-
al level. The Treaty of Lisbon notably strengthened the position of national parlia-
ments to bring the citizens of each Member State closer to the EU decision-making 
process.67 Special EU affairs committees have been established at the legislatures of 
Member States. Their task is to monitor the government’s position and arrangements 
made at the EU level. However, early agreements make it practically impossible 
for these bodies to monitor the procedures, governments and collect information on 
interinstitutional negotiations as key decisions are taken at informal meetings be-
fore the Council and Member States adopt common positions. Consequently, when a 
minister presents the national parliament with the formal decision of the Council at 
first reading, the outcome of its evaluation by the MPs is insignificant as everything 
has been agreed already.68
DECREASING SIGNIfICANCE Of PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES
The Committees of the European Parliament are bodies that play a crucial role 
in the legislative process and thus are sometimes referred to as the “legislative back-
bone” of the EP. They have the final say on the legal position of the legislature.69 In 
principle, amendments put forward by the committees are accepted by the Parlia-
ment without major modifications.70 Their role is also important in the context of 
democracy deficit. Their meetings are public and even broadcast live on the Inter-
net71. furthermore, documentation of their activities is publicly available which is 
66 D. Toshkov, A. Rasmussen, Time to Decide: The Effect of Early Agreements on Legislative Du-
ration in the EU, http://www.dimiter.eu/articles/codecision%20duration%2029092011.pdf, p. 19. Con-
trary view in: C. Reh, A. Héritier, E. Bressanelli, C. Koop, op. cit., p. 32.
67 E. Popławska, Rola parlamentów narodowych w świetle Traktatu z Lizbony, “Przegląd Sejmowy” 
2010, vol. 18, no. 5, pp. 157-174; J. J. Węc, The Influence of National Parliaments on the Decision-
Making Process in the European Union. New Challenges in the Light of the Lisbon Treaty, “Politeja” 
2008, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 187-208.
68 H. farrell, A. Héritier, The Invisible Transformation..., p. 8.
69 M. Westlake (1994), A Modern Guide to the European Parliament, London – New York, 
pp. 191-192.
70 K. Collins, C. Burns, A. Warleigh, Policy Entrepreneurs: The Role of European Parliament 
Committees in the Making of EU Policy, “Statute Law Review” 1998,vol. 19, no. 1, p. 6; S. Bowler, 
D. farrell, The Organizing of the European Parliament: Committees, Specialization, and Coordination, 
“British Journal of Political Science” 1995, vol. 25, no. 2, p. 234; V. Mamadouh, T. Raunio, The Com-
mittee System: Powers, Appointments and Report Allocation, “Journal of Common Market Studies” 
2003, vol. 41, no. 2, p. 348; G. McElroy (2006), Committee Representation in the European Parliament, 
“European Union Politics” vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 10-13.
71 At the website of the European Parliament television channel: http://www.europarltv.europa.
eu/pl/home.aspx.
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particularly important as it contains materials provided by the Commission and the 
Council. The strong position of EP committees is a positive element in the deci-
sion-making process.
Recently, however, the status of these bodies lowered which is reflected 
by the gradual decline in committees’ amendments adopted in plenaries. This is 
primarily a consequence of early agreements. An analysis of legislative proposals 
debated in the sixth term of the EP demonstrates that if an early agreement was 
reached before the committee adopted the report, on average 90% of the commit-
tee’s amendments was adopted in plenary, but if the agreement was reached after the 
adoption of the report, the percentage of approved modifications was only 31%.72 
The most drastic drop occurred in three committees: ECON, ENVI, and TRAN, i.e. 
in committees that focus on areas that usually evoke the heaviest contestation of 
the Parliament73. A less dramatic drop was observed in the case of ITRE and EMPL, 
which might result from the socialisation and deep feeling of community observed 
among members of those bodies.74 Informal compromises prevail after the adoption 
of the report by the committee. In the sixth term of the EP that applied to 75.2% of 
all early agreements.75 This means that should there be a large number of legislative 
proposals, the committees cease to be the “legislative backbone” of the Parliament.76
However, early agreements are not the only factor that contributes to the weak-
ening of the legislative position of EP committees. Recently, some informal mech-
anisms have surfaced and moved negotiations on legislative proposals outside the 
committee frame. The Services Directive (also referred to as the “Bolkenstein Di-
rective”) is a good example.77 During its adoption process, two negotiation groups 
composed of five to six MEPs of largest political groups – EPP and PES, were es-
tablished. Their members were appointed to proportionally represent the “old” and 
“new” EU Member States and the Member State that held the Presidency at the 
time (Austria). The groups met once a week to prepare a legislative compromise 
on the Services Directive. finally, their proposal of amendments was presented to 
the plenary and not the report of the committee.78 Another phenomenon that can 
72 If the agreement is reached before the report is adopted, then an average of 99% of committee 
amendments is accepted at the plenary.
73 R. Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou, A. Vidal-Quadras, M. Rothe, op. cit., pp. 34-35; f. Hayes-Renshaw, 
W. van Aken, H. Wallace, op. cit., p. 171.
74 C. Neuhold, “We Are the Employment Team”: Socialisation in European Parliament Committees 
and Possible Effects on Policy-Making, paper presented at EUSA Tenth Biennial International 
Conference, Montreal, Canada, 17-19 May 2007.
75 N. Yordanova, Plenary ‘Amendments’ to Committee Reports:..., p. 10.
76 A. Kirpsza, “Legislacyjny kręgosłup” czy techniczny organ pomocniczy? Pozycja komisji Parla-
mentu Europejskiego w procesie legislacyjnym, “Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny”, 2011, no. 4.
77 Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 
on the services in the internal market, “Official Journal of the European Union” of 27 December 2006, 
L 376, pp. 36-68.
78 P. Settembri, C. Neuhold, op. cit., p. 145.
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be observed is the ad hoc establishment of informal structures composed of MEPs 
and representatives of non-parliamentary interest groups. The Bolkenstein Directive 
serves as a good example here as well. In order to reach a compromise on this issue, 
the EMPL appointed a Trade Union Intergroup consisting of one to two MEPs from 
each and every parliamentary group and delegates of the European Trade Union 
Confederation (ETUC). Arrangements reached within the Trade Union Intergroup 
had major impact on the final version of the committee’s report, which indicates that 
the autonomy of the committee gets limited.79
The above developments that limit the position of the committee generate a num-
ber of negative consequences for the legislative process. firstly, they give trilogue 
participants increasingly more options to escape the supervision of the Parliament 
because if the proper legislative process is moved outside the legislature, the com-
mittees are not capable of controlling and sanctioning the relais actors. Secondly, 
they disrupt the consensual nature of the decision-making process at the Parliament. 
Research shows that the average majority by which reports are adopted in commit-
tees amounts to about 95%.80 This means that the adopted amendments are almost 
always legitimised by all EP groups. The consensus allows smaller groups to par-
ticipate in the legislative process and weakens the diktat of the EPP-S&D coali-
tion81 facilitating deliberations and not the Westminster democracy model82 founded 
on rivalry between major political groups. However, moving negotiations outside 
the committee to the elitist trilogues does entail a consensus breakdown because 
the commission’s amendments are generally not accepted in plenaries. They lose to 
modifications agreed upon at trilateral meetings. In result, the position of the Parlia-
ment does not reflect the views of the proportional representation of all MEPs but is 
the resultant of bargains between three largest parliamentary groups (EPP, S&D and 
ALDE) that form victorious coalitions.83 Thirdly, the degradation of the committees’ 
position causes expertise problems for MEPs. Since most EU legislation is of techni-
cal and regulatory nature84, MEPs need opinions of experts to take rational decisions. 
Previously, expertises were provided by the committees that drafted them in coop-
79 Ibid., p. 143.
80 Ibid., p. 137; P. Settembri, Is the European Parliament Competitive or Consensual... “And Why 
Bother”?, paper presented to the federal Trust Workshop ‘The European Parliament and the European 
Political Space’, 30 March 2006, London, p. 19.
81 S. Hix, A. Kreppel, A. Noury, The Party System in the European Parliament: Collusive or 
Competitive?, “Journal of Common Market Studies” 2003, vol. 41, no. 2, p. 318.
82 See: A. Lijphart (1984), Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government 
in Twenty-one Countries, New Haven; Idem (1999), Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and 
Performance in Thirty-six Countries, New Haven.
83 See: S. Hix, What to Expect in the 2009-14 European Parliament: Return of the Grand Co-
alition?, “SIEPS Report” 200, no. 8, p. 11; Voting in the 2009-2014 European Parliament: Who 
Holds the Power?, “Votewatch Report” July 2011, http://www.votewatch.eu/blog/wp-content/uploads 
/2011/07/votewatch–report-july-2011-who-holds-the-power.pdf, p. 4.
84 Regulatory and administrative proposals constituted 55.7% of all legislative proposals presented 
by the Commission in the years 1999-2007. See: R. Kardasheva, Legislative Package Deals..., p. 116.
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eration with public organisations, having listened to the parties concerned, holding 
talks with specialists or tasking EU officers with drafting such reports.85 When tri-
logues take decisions, MEPs, who do not have access to trilateral negotiations, are 
not provided with the required expertise and that puts them in a difficult negotiation 
position especially while negotiating with the Council and the Commission, which 
have a large group of specialists at their disposal (employees of the General Secre-
tariat of the Council and employees of the Directorates-General at the Commission). 
fourthly, the exclusion of an EP committee also leads to democracy deficit as the 
debates open to the public are held by committees and it is the committees that stay 
in touch with other EU institutions.
The Parliament attempted to combat these phenomena. In 2004, it adopted rec-
ommendations on good practices in codecision which strengthened the superviso-
ry functions of the committees over trilogue participants.86 These, however, were 
not obligatory and brimming with such words as “should” and “may”, and were 
not universally implemented. further attempts to introduce reforms were made in 
2009, when the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament were revised under 
the Corbett report. The reform consisted in adding Annex XXI to the EP Rules of 
Procedure. The new provisions included the Code of Conduct for Negotiating in the 
Context of the Ordinary Legislative Procedures that was drafted by the parliamentary 
reform working group.87 The Annex granted four significant powers to the commit-
tee. Those rights facilitated controlling the trilogues and limiting the independence 
of relais actors. firstly, the committee was granted the status of the EP competent 
body in trilateral negotiations which decides on entering a trilogue (point 1 and 2 of 
the Code). Secondly, the committee could also specify the composition of the EP’s 
negotiation team participating in the trilogue. Generally, the composition of a negoti-
ation team should be a politically balanced representation of all EP groups (point 3 of 
the Code). This change was significant, as previously it was the political group coor-
dinators who took decisions on the team composition.88 Thirdly, before the trilogues, 
the committee was to adopt a mandate for the EP negotiation team the basis of which 
would be the amendments adopted in the commission or in the plenary and the pri-
85 C. Neuhold, The “Legislative Backbone” Keeping the Institution Upright? The Role of Euro-
pean Parliament Committees in the EU Policy-Making Process, “European Integration online Papers” 
2001, vol. 5, no. 10, pp. 8-9.
86 First and second reading agreements: guidelines for best practice within Parliament, http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/code/information/guidelines–en.pdf. The guidelines have been discussed in: 
A. Héritier, C. Reh, Codecision and Its Discontents:..., pp. 22-23.
87 Annex XXI: Code of conduct for negotiating in the context of the ordinary legislative procedures, 
in: Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament, sixth term – January 2012 (hereinafter referred to 
as “the Code”). The revision entered into force at the beginning of the seventh term of the European 
Parliament. 
88 A. Héritier, C. Reh, Codecision Transformed: Informal Politics, Power Shifts and Institutional 
Change in the European Parliament, paper prepared for the UACES Conference on Exchanging Ideas 
on Europe, Ecole Supérieure des Sciences Commerciales d’Angers, 3-5 September 2009, p. 25.
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orities and a time limit for the negotiations as specified by the committee (point 4 
of the Code). fourthly, the commission was authorised to control the trilogue. After 
each trilateral meeting, the EP negotiation team was to inform the committee about 
the negotiation outcomes and provide a draft agreement that was to be examined at 
the committee’s sitting. The committee was also entitled to update the mandate of 
the EP negotiation team if further negotiations were required (point 6 of the Code).
It is difficult to state whether the above changes have boosted the committee 
status. first of all, some provisions of the Code contradict the Rules of Procedure 
of the European Parliament. In the Code, it is stipulated that the decision on enter-
ing trilogue negotiations is taken by “broad consensus” within a committee, while 
Article 70, Par. 2 of the Rules of Procedure states that a majority vote is required. 
The same provision in the Rules of Procedure foresees that before a trilogue, the 
relevant commission should adopt the “mandate, directions or priorities”, while the 
Code mentions the defined mandate and priorities (point 4.1 of the Code). The Code 
also introduces the EP negotiation team of enigmatic composition which is contrary 
to the provisions of the Rules of Procedure that grant significant and independent 
legislative rights to the rapporteur. Moreover, the Code lists numerous exceptions 
that significantly limit the position of the committees. for example, if it is impossible 
for a committee to examine the draft agreement because of its timing (fast agree-
ment ending with the committee’s vote or an urgent agreement), “the decision on the 
agreement shall be taken by the rapporteur and the shadow rapporteurs, if necessary 
together with the committee chair and the coordinators” (point 6.2 of the Code), i.e. 
the committee as a whole hardly has a say there. Similarly, when trilogues are held 
before the committee’s vote, the committee does not specify the mandate, only pro-
vides guidelines to the EP negotiation team (point 4.2 of the Code). In the Code ex-
pressions like “as a general rule”, “as far as possible”, “in the exceptional case”, “if 
this is not possible” and “if necessary” are used and they allow for some freedom of 
interpretation. Let us take the following sentence as an example: “As a general rule, 
the amendments adopted in committee or in plenary shall form the basis for the man-
date of the EP negotiating team”. This means that in non-defined individual cases this 
rule does not have to be applied. It is also worth noting that the Code does not consist 
of imperative sentences but of guidelines, e.g. “The decision [of the committee – 
author’s note] to seek to achieve an agreement early in the legislative process shall 
be a case-by-case decision, taking account of the distinctive characteristics of each 
individual file” (point 2 of the Code). This means that the committee does not have 
to examine each and every proposal to decide about the EP’s participation in the 
trilogue but may adopt the general rule of participation in every trilogue. To sum up, 
the Code does not only fail to solve many of the the discussed problems but it largely 
contributes to the informality of the trilogues and all their negative consequences for 
EP committees.89 On the one hand, the above poses a risk of “geometrical legisla-
89 A. Héritier, C. Reh, Codecision Transformed:..., p. 28.
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tion”, i.e. a committees may reach its internal compromise on the right to supervise 
trilogues and another committee will not be capable of agreeing on the supervision. 
In the latter situation the role of the relais actors gets strengthened. On the other 
hand, sustaining the trilogue informal status entails the threat of path-dependence90, 
i.e. the irreversible and enrooted actual degradation of the committees’ legislative 
functions.
THE COUNCIL Of MINISTERS WITHOUT MINISTERS
from the above it follows that the Parliament is excluded from many EU areas, 
and, in result, it is the Council that is the most important legislator in the EU.91 It 
takes part in all legislative procedures and in some cases e.g. consultation or in-
formation, it holds formal legislative monopoly. full access to information about 
the decision-making process that takes place in this institution is crucial for transpar-
ency of EU institutional law. It is not simple as it depends on the Council’s internal 
regulations on decision-making.
Although formally, the Council is composed of representatives of ministries, 
it actually has a complex organisational structure that consists of three levels: work-
ing groups (lowest level), special committees (COREPER and SCA – medium level) 
and ministers (highest level). The Council has developed its specific decision-mak-
ing system reflected in the agenda structure of its meetings. On the agenda there are 
points A, B, I, and II. Under point A are legislative agreements agreed at lower levels 
which are adopted by ministers automatically and without further discussion. Under 
point B are proposals that remain problematic or unresolved after deliberations and 
negotiations at the two lower levels of the Council decision-making process and they 
are subject to ministerial debates and decisions.92 Taking into consideration that only 
ministerial meetings are open to the public, the society can only control legislative 
proposals adopted in the latter case. If a legislative proposal is agreed at the lower 
levels of the Council decision-making process, civic monitoring is impossible as 
meetings of working groups and COREPER are held in camera, and documents they 
examine are in general confidential.
The problem is that the direct and actual involvement of ministers in the legis-
lative process at the Council keeps decreasing. In 1994, the ministers debated 61% 
90 P. Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics, “American Political 
Science Review” 2000, vol. 94, no. 2, pp. 251-267.
91See: S. Hagemann, B. Høyland, Bicameral Politics in the European Union, “Journal of Common 
Market Studies” 2010, vol. 48, no. 4, pp. 811-833.
92 The division of legislative work at the Council has been presented in a simplified version here, 
as in practice it is teeming with exceptions. See: f. Häge, Politicising Council Decision-Making: The 
Effect of European Parliament Empowerment, “West European Politics” 2011, vol. 34, no. 1, pp. 18-47; 
idem, Who Decides in the Council of the European Union?, “Journal Common Market Studies” 2008, 
vol. 46, no. 3, pp. 533-558.
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of all proposals. In 2006, this percentage fell to a mere 15%. This means that the 
increasingly heavy burden of reaching common positions at the Council has been 
handed over to working groups and COREPER. In last five years (2003-2007), de-
cisions on as much as 76% of legislative acts were de facto reached in those lower 
bodies (points A on the ministerial agenda). Consequently, the possibilities of su-
pervising the legislative procedure have been significantly limited. The procedure is 
increasingly non-transparent which increases the democratic deficit and makes room 
for uncontrolled lobbying of big European companies and conglomerates.
Apart from impacting democratic procedures, activities of the “Council of Min-
isters without ministers” have other consequences. The dominance of lower-level 
entities, especially working groups composed of experts and not politicians or dip-
lomats, leads to technocratisation of the EU law.93 Legislative agreements reached 
at that level are often overregulated, complicated and incomprehensible for average 
citizens. The complicated nature of the EU law boosts the significance of lawyers 
and linguists. Their assistance in resolving abstract problems is absolutely indis-
pensable but, on the other hand, it allows them to use their authority and expertise 
to manipulate the interpretation of the new law according to their own preferences. 
Sociologists increasingly point to the existence of the so-called juridical (social) 
field94 in the EU, i.e. a highly-organised, professional and isolated group of legalists 
that hold symbolical authority over knowledge and procedures and thanks to it they 
can “colonise” the non-judicial world.95 The example of the role of the Legal Service 
of the Council General Secretariat in preparing treaties and legal acts supports this 
thesis.96
CONCLUSIONS
In this article, at least six legislative problems which the EU will have to solve, 
have been identified. The first one is the observed exclusion of the European Parlia-
93 A. Harcourt, C. Radaelli, Limits to EU Technocratic Regulation?, “European Journal of Political 
Research” 1999, vol. 35, no. 1, pp. 107-122; W. Wallace, J. Smith (1995), Democracy or Technocracy? 
European Integration and the Problem of Popular Consent, “West European Politics”, vol. 18, no. 3, 
pp. 137-157.
94 P. Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field, “Hastings European 
Law Review” 1986, vol. 38, no. 5, pp. 805-835.
95 A. Stone Sweet, Integration and Constitutionalism in the European Union, in: A. Cohen, 
A. Vauchez (ed.) (2007), La Constitution Européenne. Elites, Mobilisations, Votes, Bruxelles, pp. 12-13.
96 See: D. Beach, The Unseen Hand in Treaty Reform Negotiations: The Role and Influence 
of the Council Secretariat, “Journal of European Public Policy” 2004, vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 408-439; 
T. Christiansen, S. Vanhoonacker, At a Critical Juncture? Change and Continuity in the Institutional 
Development of the Council Secretariat, “West European Politics” 2008, vol. 31, no. 4, pp. 751-770; 
M. Mangenot, L’affirmation du Secrétariat général du Conseil de l’Union européenne: les transfor-
mations du rôle d’une institution non codifiée, “L’institutionnalisation de l’Europe”, Table-ronde no. 5, 
VIIe congrès de l’Association française de science politique, Lille, 18-21 septembre 2002.
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ment from legislative procedures. Although the Lisbon Treaty expanded the legisla-
tive competences of the EP, it also increased the number of areas where the EP has 
no formal authority to roughly 37%. This applies especially to the former second 
(CfSP) pillar and partly to the third pillar, as well as to numerous important elements 
of first pillar policies. In result, in these areas legislation has been monopolised by 
the Council, access to information is hardly possible, democratic control of the deci-
sion-making process is limited, and the monitoring capacity of national parliaments 
is provisional.
The second challenge is the illusory prevalence of the ordinary legislative pro-
cedure (OLP). Although after the entering into force of the TL about 90% of all leg-
islative proposals have been adopted under this procedure, a more thorough analysis 
reveals that the OLP is foreseen in 46% of primary law provisions. The remaining 
provisions mention different legislative schemes, whereby as much as 41% of arti-
cles concern consultation and information, where the Parliament’s position is weak. 
Both those procedures concern areas that are characterised by a low frequency of 
regulation, nevertheless they are very important. There the monopoly of the Council 
is less far reaching and the public has more possibilities to control the procedure. 
Still, the legislative impact of the Parliament has been significantly limited.
The third issue refers to the advancing de-formalisation of the legislative pro-
cess. It is reflected in the composition of trilogues, i.e. informal meetings of rep-
resentatives of the Council, Parliament and Commission at early stages of legisla-
tive procedures with a view to reach a legislative agreement. Although they foster 
cooperation and interdependence between the participating institutions, they also 
yield revolutionary side effects: they move negotiations outside the said institutions, 
allow only the elite to access the legislative process by granting a small group of 
representatives the function of “legislative intermediaries”, introduce asymmetry be-
tween members of the Council and the Parliament in shaping EU legislation, reduce 
transparency, generate problems in coordination of and control over trilogue nego-
tiators, and increase the significance of national bonds between representatives of 
the Council and the Parliament in the adoption process. These phenomena derail the 
formal picture of the legislative procedure that follows from treaties. Consequently, 
the procedure becomes unpredictable and difficult to monitor.
The fourth issue is the acceleration of legislative procedures which is reflected 
by the adoption of early agreements and the “death” of the second and third read-
ings. Members of the Council and Parliament have become politically and formal-
ly limited in their capacity to present amendments to legislative proposals. Public 
control over the legislative process at the plenary level of both institutions has also 
been reduced. The time for deliberations, debates with social partners and political 
bargaining on the final version of a proposal has been notably reduced. The right of 
national parliaments to monitor the emergence of law has been blocked.
The fifth challenge is the degradation of the role of EP Committees in the legisla-
tive procedure. If after the adoption of the report by the committee, a trilogue is held 
and produces an early agreement, which is often the case, the percentage of com-
mittee’s amendments adopted at the EP plenary falls from 90% to 31%. The Parlia-
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ment also impedes its committees by establishing informal ad hoc groups composed 
of parliamentary and non-parliamentary representatives whose goal is to secretly 
work toward difficult legislative compromises without the involvement of commit-
tees. Moreover, EP committees keep losing their influence on the legislative process 
because of trilogies, as the composition and negotiation framework of the latter are 
in the hands of group coordinators. The weakening of the committee’s status means 
that the participants of trilateral meetings escape the authority of the Parliament, 
which disrupts the consensual manner of adopting amendments at the European Par-
liament. furthermore, the legitimisation of amendments by all, even the smallest 
parliamentary groups decreases; MEPs do not have access to expert opinions which 
puts them in a difficult situation while negotiating at trilogues and, finally, democrat-
ic deficit grows. The Parliament tried to reduce the impact of the above changes by 
reforming the 2009 Rules of Procedure. However, it seems that these efforts will not 
have much impact on the standing of the committees. The regulations are too open 
and blurry. What is more, informal norms and relations have become embedded in 
the EU legislative procedure and therefore they are difficult to uproot.
The sixth legislative challenge concerns the significantly lesser involvement of 
ministers in the legislative process. In 2003-2007, about 76% of legislative proposals 
were agreed at lower levels of the Council’s organisational structure and ministers 
adopted them only formally, i.e. without discussing them. This phenomenon leads to 
technocratisation of the EU law, the increasing significance of lawyers and linguists 
and to the deepening democracy deficit.
Those phenomena remodel the legislative process, relations between institutions 
as well as relations between institutions and EU citizens. The European Union should 
therefore quickly respond to these challenged by developing appropriate formal and 
informal rules of procedure. If actions are not taken, these disadvantageous practices 
might become deeply enrooted in the EU and at some point they might prove irre-
versible. This would be an enormous problem for the institutional and public control 
of the legislative process.
ABSTRACT
The purpose of the article is to identify the legislative challenges of the European Union that 
became apparent after implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon provisions. At least six such threats are 
diagnosed. Firstly, the Treaty of Lisbon has deepened the European Parliament legislative exclusion by 
increasing the number of areas where it does not have any formal powers. Secondly, more than half of 
the Treaty bases for enacting legislation includes procedures other than the ordinary legislative proce-
dure which relatively weakens the position of the Parliament. Thirdly, the habit of trilogues – informal 
meetings between the Council, Commission and Parliament in the early stages of the legislative proce-
dure generates serious consequences for the status of institutions and democracy in the EU. Fourthly, 
the custom of so-called early agreements results in almost complete disappearance of the second and 
third reading and quickens the decision-making process at the expense of its transparency. Fifthly, tri-
logues and early agreements degraded the role of the European Parliament’s committees in legislative 
proceedings. Finally, there is a declining involvement of ministers in the legislative process, resulting in 
technocratic and secret decision making.
